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In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest
bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical
expression for the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution
as a function of the mean number of players, and compare them with a large dataset of internet
auctions. The theory agrees with the data with striking accuracy for small population size N ,
while for larger N a qualitatively different distribution is observed. We interpret this result as
the emergence of two different regimes, one in which adaptation is feasible and one in which it is
not. Our results question the actual possibility of a large population to adapt and find the optimal
strategy when participating in a collective game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.-k
In recent years, statistical physics has provided pow-
erful tools to study both equilibria [1, 2] and dynamical
properties [3–6] of games where the number of players is
large. So far, most of the efforts in this field have been
focused on games in which interactions among players are
pairwise, the most notable and studied example being the
prisoner’s dilemma [3]. However, there are many exam-
ples of collective games where a unique winner is singled
out from a large population. In such cases, comparing
theory with empirical data is particularly challenging: as
the number of players increases, the statistical descrip-
tion becomes more appropriate. However, the complex-
ity of the equilibrium strategy may also increase, thus
making it more difficult for real agents to infer it from
available information [7].
Online auctions provide a fertile, yet scarcely investi-
gated ground for exploring this problem [8–11]: the avail-
ability of large datasets provides a unique opportunity
to study whether strategies of real players actually max-
imize their winning chances. Here, we focus on lowest
unique bid auctions. This game is interesting for two
reasons. First, it is sufficiently simple to allow for a com-
prehensive mathematical analysis [12, 13]. Second, many
detailed auction records are freely available online. The
game is formulated as follows: N players can bid for an
item of value V . The bid must be a multiple of a min-
imum amount, so that one can effectively consider bid
amounts as natural numbers. The winner (if any) is the
player who places the lowest bid, which is unique, i.e. no
other player bid on that amount. All players must pay a
fee c to take part in the auction; additionally, the winner
has to pay the bid amount.
In this Letter, we derive an explicit analytic expres-
sion for the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the lowest
unique bid auction and explore its dependence on the to-
tal number of players N . To achieve an explicit solution
we assume that N is not fixed, but fluctuates according
to a Poissonian distribution, in analogy with the choice
of the grand canonical ensemble in equilibrium statistical
mechanics. We then compare the expression with a large
dataset [14] where players are informed in advance of the
total number of allowed bids N . We find a remarkable
change in the data as N increases: in the low N regime
(fewer than ≈ 200 players), the theory predicts very well
the bid distribution. In this regime the game is effectively
a lottery, since winning chances are evenly spread on any
number. Conversely, in the large N regime, the data de-
viate from the theoretical solution and rather follow an
exponential distribution. Here, players fail to adapt to
the optimal strategy and the winning chances are highly
dependent on the chosen number.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, all players adopt the
same strategy, and no player can benefit from chang-
ing strategy unilaterally, i.e., should any of the players
change strategy, his expected payoff would be equal or
worse. Consider N individuals playing according to the
same strategy p = (p1, p2, p3 . . .), where pk is the prob-
ability of bidding the number k. Then, the distribution
of bids is multinomial:
P(n) =
N !
n1!n2! . . .
pn11 p
n2
2 . . . (1)
where n = (n1, n2, n3 . . .) are the number of bids placed
on each number k. For convenience, we introduce the
generating function:
GN (x) =
∑
{n}
P(n) xn11 x
n2
2 . . . = (x · p)
N
. (2)
We now assume that N is not fixed, but fluctuates ac-
cording to a Poissonian distribution of mean λ, leading
2to a grand canonical generating function:
G˜λ(x) =
∑
N
λNe−λ
N !
GN (x) = exp[λ(p · x− 1)], (3)
i.e. the number of bids on each number is also Poisson
distributed with mean fk = λpk. By differentiating G˜
with respect to x, it is straightforward to compute the
probabilities wk of k being the winning number, i.e. that
there is a unique bid on k and no unique bids on lower
numbers:
wk = fke
−fk
k−1∏
j=1
(1− fje
−fj ), (4)
It is also useful to compute the probability ck of k being
a potential winning number, i.e. that there are no bids
on k and no winners on lower numbers:
ck = e
−fk
k−1∏
j=1
(1− fje
−fj ). (5)
We note that the probability of each bid to be a winner
on a given number, wk/fk, is equal to the probability, ck,
of numbers to be potential winning numbers, which is a
peculiar property of Poisson games [15].
The expected payoff for a player bidding k will be
(V − k)wk/fk − c. At equilibrium, the expected pay-
off should be independent of k. Otherwise, players could
benefit from bidding on numbers with high payoffs more
frequently. Imposing this condition leads to a recurrence
relation for the average bidding frequencies
fk+1 = ln
(
efk − fk
)
+ ln
(
1−
1
V − k
)
(6)
To avoid a negative number of bids, the support of the
distribution must be limited to the region where all fk’s
are positive. In this region k < V holds, so that the fk’s
are strictly decreasing. The initial condition f1 has to be
determined iteratively from the condition
∑
j fj = λ.
If the frequencies fk tend to zero for values of k much
smaller than the value of the item V (a condition that
is always fulfilled in our dataset, and will be consistently
assumed in the following), the last term in (6) can be
disregarded. In this limit (formally corresponding to
V →∞) the recurrence relation has been derived in [13]
and it is well defined for all values of k ∈ N . We extend
this solution by noting that the normalization condition∑
k fk = λ implies an explicit expression of f1: eq. 6
can be written as fk = e
fk − efk+1, which summed over
k yields the initial condition f1 = ln(λ + 1). This al-
lows for an explicit expression for any specific fk’s by
iteration. Substituting the solution into (4) also shows
that the average chance of winning of each bid is equal
to (λ+ 1)−1, which is also equal to the chance of having
no winner in the auction.
Before discussing the comparison with the data, we
briefly study some properties of the Nash equilibrium dis-
tribution. When fk ≫ 1, a continuous approximation of
(6) shows that fk decreases logarithmically with k. For
small fk ≪ 1, one can approximate fk+1 ≈ f2k/2, show-
ing that the distribution has a super-exponential cutoff.
The scaling of the value k∗(λ), around which the cut-
off occurs, can be estimated in the following way. By
removing all the players that bid on k = 1 we change
the average number of players by the amount f1 giving
λnew = λold − ln(λold + 1). This is equivalent to shifting
the whole distribution by one along the k axis, resulting
in k∗new = k
∗
old − 1. This scaling transformation in the
continuum limit becomes dλ/dk∗ = ln(λ + 1), with the
solution k∗(λ) = li(1 + λ) + C, where li(z) =
∫ z
0
dt/ ln t
is the logarithmic integral and C is a constant of O(1).
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FIG. 1: Histograms of bidding frequencies compared with
the theoretical equilibrium distribution. Panels A-D show
average histograms of different auctions with similar number
of players and same item value. Panel E compares histograms
of auctions with similar number of players, but significantly
different item values. Panel F is same as panel D but in linear-
log scale, to illustrate the exponential shape of the empirical
distribution at large N .
We now move to the comparison of the equilibrium so-
lution with empirical data from the website [14]. The
dataset includes 724 online auctions from April 2007 to
January 2011 with a variable number of bids ranging from
3N = 26 to N = 4748. The number of allowed bids in
a particular auction is announced before bidding starts,
and the auction closes when this number is reached. Each
player is allowed a limited number of bids. The average
number of bids per player in the full dataset is only 2.47
and very weakly dependent on N . In Supplementary in-
formation, we demonstrate with agent based simulations
that allowing a small number of multiple bids per player
do not alter significatively the equilibrium strategy. For
this reason, in the subsequent analysis we will neglect the
effect of multiple bids by the same player and treat the
bids as statistically independent.
In Fig. 1 we compare the theoretical and empirical
bidding frequencies in different auctions having different
numbers of players and different item values. In order to
make the histograms smoother, we averaged each panel
over L different auctions having similar numbers of play-
ers and same item value (shown in the figure).
On the fine scale of single numbers, the data show a
structure dictated by known psychological effects. Play-
ers tend to favor odd numbers over even numbers. Some
specific numbers (like 17 and other primes) are perceived
to be ‘original’ by some players, and are chosen with sig-
nificantly larger probability than neighboring ones.
On a coarser scale, the agreement between theory and
data is striking for smaller auctions (i.e. fewer than 200
players, panels A and B of Fig. 1). It is particularly
remarkable that the empirical histograms reproduce the
sharp cutoff, considering the non-trivial dependence of
k∗ on the number of players.
Theoretically, players should adjust their bidding
strategies according to the number of players rather than
the item value, which can be assumed to be infinite. In all
auctions in the dataset, the cutoffs of the corresponding
theoretical distributions occur at bid values much smaller
than the item values (shown in panels). To test whether
the empirical bidding distributions are independent of
V , panel E compares two sets of auctions with the same
number of players, but with item values that differ by a
factor of three. The bidding distribution for the pricey
item have a slightly heavier tail, but overall the distribu-
tions are very similar.
The agreement between theory and data progressively
deteriorates as the number of players increases (see panel
C and D). For a large number of players (more than 2000)
an exponential distribution fits the data better, as shown
in the lower panels of Fig. 1. This can be understood by
arguing (see e.g. [16–18]) that players having incomplete
information about the game play according to a strategy
defined as pk = exp(−βEk)/
∑
j
exp(−βEj) where Ek is
the expected payoff when placing a bid k and β quantifies
the degree of uncertainty about the game. If players have
poor knowledge about the optimal strategy, they could
assume a uniform prior probability to win on each k,
resulting in Ek decreasing linearly with k due to the cost
of the bid when winning. Substituting this prior into the
logit strategy yields a strategy exponentially decreasing
with bid size.
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FIG. 2: l2 distance between the theoretical solution and the
empirical histogram for each auction. The continuous line is
the theoretical expectation 〈d〉 = N−1 if all bids for each his-
togram were randomly drawn for the theoretical distribution.
A quantitative measure of how the data deviate from
theory is shown in Fig. 2, where, for each auction, we plot
the l2 distance d between the theoretical probability dis-
tribution and the empirical one, d = N−2
∑
k(fk − φk)
2,
where φk is the number of bids on k in a given auction.
If bids were randomly drawn from the theoretical distri-
bution, the expected distance would decrease with the
number of players as 〈d〉 = N−1. Empirically, the dis-
tances have a large spread around the expected value for
small auctions and are consistently larger than expected
for N > 200. This outcome cannot be simply explained
by the larger number of auctions for smaller N : as a con-
sequence of players’ turnover, the distributions at fixed
N do not evolve with time in a significant way, as we
checked by comparing older to more recent auctions.
Another interesting quantity is the distribution of ac-
tual winning numbers. At equilibrium, it should be
equal to the distribution of bids. As shown in Fig. 3,
the empirical distribution of winning numbers supports
this feature. The vast majority of winning numbers fall
within the theoretical cutoff (pink shaded area of Fig.
3). In the figure, we also show the analytical estimate
k∗ ≈ (1 + 1/ lnN)N/ lnN based on the asymptotic ex-
pansion of the logarithmic integral. The black line is the
average winning number, which in the relevant range,
scales approximately in the same way as the cutoff.
Binning the data yields average winning numbers in
excellent agreement with the theory, even for large N
where the empirical distribution of bids departs from the
theory. However, the variance of winning numbers be-
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FIG. 3: Panel A: Winning numbers as function of auction size.
The continuous line is the theoretical average and the shaded
area denotes the region where bids are below the theoretical
cutoff k∗. Panel B: average and standard deviation of the
winning numbers, compared with the respective theoretical
lines.
comes much smaller than the theoretical prediction for
N > 103. To further explore this phenomenon, we com-
pute the actual probabilities to win on a certain number,
given the empirical distributions of bids for auctions of
various sizes. This probability is given by wk/fk which,
since ck = wk/fk, is the same as the probability to win
on a certain number for an additional player entering
the game. The results are shown in Fig. 4 for the same
examples considered in Fig. 1. For auctions with few
players, the largest chance of winning is not more than
4− 5 times higher than (N +1)−1, the winning probabil-
ity at the Nash equilibrium. In this region, the game is
not very different from a lottery, as the winning chances
do not depend much on the chosen number k ≪ V . In
contrast, for large auctions, the winning chances on low
and high numbers are very small, while intermediate bids
may have a winning chance more than 60 times higher
than the average bid in the Nash equilibrium, providing
opportunities for exploitation and thus potential room
for adaptation.
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FIG. 4: Winning chances when bidding k. Black lines are
the same empirical data as panels A-D of Fig. 1. Gray (red
online) lines are the relative probabilities to win when betting
on k given that all other players bid according to the empirical
distribution. To help the comparison, we have renormalized
the winning probabilities, ck, with their value for the Nash
equilibrium (N + 1)−1. The shaded points mark the actual
winning bids for each auction (arbitrary y-position).
Summarizing, in this Letter we derived the analyti-
cal equilibrium bidding distribution for the lowest unique
bid auction and compared it with empirical data. The
emerging picture is that players are able to infer the op-
timal strategy with striking accuracy when the number
of players N is not too large. In the large N regime,
the population-level strategy is highly non-optimal and
it seems to be determined by the simple principle of not
assuming a particular preference for any number while
avoiding the cost of large bids.
This result raises non-trivial questions about the effec-
tiveness of adaptive dynamics in collective games. While
it has been studied whether adaptation eventually drives
the system to the optimal solution or generates more
complex dynamical behaviors [19], it is also crucial to
assess how fast the equilibrium is reached. A thorough
study of adaptive dynamics in such system will be the
subject of a future study; in Supplementary Information,
we show that indeed, in the simple case of replicator dy-
namics, adaptation becomes slower at larger N . Such
slowdown could prevent the inference of the equilibrium
strategy for large populations in realistic time-scales, and
thus explain the increasing lack of adaptation in our data
as N grows.
We acknowledge useful discussions with M. Marsili,
K. Sneppen, C. Strandkvist and P. Kempson.
5Supplementary material for: Equilibrium
strategy and population-size effects in low-
est unique bid auctions
EFFECT OF MULTIPLE BIDS PER PLAYER
To test the effect of multiple bids, we analyzed the
statistics of the number of bids per player in the dataset.
As stated in the Letter, the average number of bids per
player is 2.47. Fig. (5, top) shows how this average is
weakly dependent on N . This means that the impact
of each player (that is, the average fraction of the total
number of bids per player) decreseas with N , as shown
in Fig. (5, bottom). This means that the discrepancy
between theory and data as N increases is very unlikely
to be caused by the effect of multiple bids per player.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
The average number of bids pr person is almost constant
Number of bids in the auction
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f b
id
s 
pe
r p
la
ye
r
 
 
Auctions
Best fit: 0.00091x + 2.1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
The impact pr person decreases as a power law with auction size
log(Number of bids in the auction)
lo
g(F
rac
tio
n o
f to
tal
 bi
ds
 m
ad
e b
y e
ac
h p
lay
er)
 
 
Auctions
Guide to eye: x−1
FIG. 5: (top) Average number of bids per player in each
auction is only weakly depended on the number of bids in
the auction. (bottom) Average fraction of bids per player
decreases with the total number of bids.
Finally, in Fig. (6) we compare the Nash equlibria for
auctions of 100 bids in the two cases where 20 players
are bidding 5 times each (solid red line) and 100 players
are bidding 1 times each (dashed green line). The Nash
equilibria in this version of the game are found using
individual-based simulations, where all players bid ac-
cording to the same distribution, except that they avoid
placing two bids on the same number in the same round.
The distribution is then adapted according to the statis-
tics of winning numbers, until reaching an equilibrium
in which bids on each number have the same winning
probability. The figure shows that, even with 5 bids per
player, the equilibrium in this version of the game is very
resemblant to the solution calculated in the Letter, where
all bids are independent.
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FIG. 6: Equilibrium bidding distribution for N = 100, com-
pared with the equilibrium distribution for 20 players, each
one bidding 5 times.
REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
In this section, we study the dependence of adaptation
speed on the number of players N . As the details of the
outcome might depend on the specific adaptation rules,
we present here results obtained by replicator dynamics,
which is one of the most general forms of macroscopic
equations for adaptive dynamics. Indeed, one can show
that many microscopic implementations of adaptive dy-
namics either converge macroscopically to the replicator
equation or to its modified form [4].
Replicator dynamics is defined by the system of equa-
tions:
d
dt
pk = pk
[
ck(p)−
∞∑
i=1
pici(p)
]
(7)
where the ck are the expected payoffs of each strategy
k, which depend on the state of the system and are de-
termined by Eq. (5) in the Letter. We chose as initial
distribution pk(t = 0) = A exp(−k/30), A being a nor-
malization constant. Fig. (7) shows that the probabil-
ity distribution converges to the Nash equilibrium slower
6and slower as N is increased. Similar results are ob-
tained when starting with different initial distributions
(apart from a difference in the initial overlap with the
Nash equilibrium).
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